Each platform delivers single-figure pay decomposition, STIP & LTIP design and outcomes, performance conditions, board & CEO shareholdings, pay ratios and say-on-pay, with up to ten years of company history. Every market is built on the same framework, so a figure from one platform can be read against a figure from another - the disclosure regimes differ, the basis we compare on does not. Pick a market below and launch straight into its interactive dashboard.
Seven companies across three markets with a free account - the same fields, charts and ten-year history as the paid platforms. Company pages are shown in full; some Remlytics cross-company views are subscription only. The quickest way to see whether the data does what you need.
AstraZeneca and BAT (FTSE 100), Schneider Electric, Enel and SAP (STOXX Europe 600), Home Depot and Mastercard (S&P 100) - chosen to span markets, sectors, pay scales and incentive designs.
Ten years and more of FTSE pay data, at full depth.
The Remlytics dashboard provides a separate analytical lens.
FTSE 100 (93), FTSE 250 (161) and FTSE SmallCap (89), placed as at the September 2026 quarterly review. Ashtead and Spectris left the index in March 2026 and December 2025 and are kept for their pay history.
Europe’s listed companies on the same framework, each in its own currency and national regime.
The Remlytics dashboard provides a separate analytical lens.
STOXX Europe 50 is the blue-chip cut; STOXX Europe 600 extends the same framework down the market-cap range across 17 markets. A STOXX page reports each company in its own quotation currency.
US large-cap pay on the same framework, from the Summary Compensation Table and Compensation Actually Paid.
The Remlytics dashboard provides a separate analytical lens.
S&P 100 is the blue-chip cut of the S&P 500 platform - the same records, filtered. US disclosure states a target and a cap as a multiple of it, where the UK states a maximum as a percentage of salary; both are held, and the platform compares on one basis.
Every company Remlytica covers, in one place: the FTSE All-Share, the S&P 500 and the STOXX Europe 600 on a single framework, searchable and comparable across markets rather than within one. Where the disclosure regimes differ, the basis we compare on does not - which is the whole point of building each market the same way. Still in development: checks on the S&P 500 beyond the S&P 100 are being completed.
Dozens of data points per company-year, organised into intuitive categories - every figure tied back to the source report.
Every figure is shaped by the disclosure regime behind it. These pages set out what governs executive pay in each market - statute, listing rules, governance codes and investor guidelines - with each rule tied to the field it explains.
Companies Act 2006, the Schedule 8 reporting rules that prescribe the single-figure table, the UK Listing Rules, the UK Corporate Governance Code across its 2018 and 2024 editions, investor guidelines, and the financial-services remuneration regime. Covers the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap.
Conventions that look like modelling choices are usually law. An LTIP is reported in the year its performance period ends, and an estimated vest value must be restated the following year - both are statutory requirements, not house style.
The Exchange Act and Dodd-Frank, Item 402 of Regulation S-K, NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards, Section 162(m) and state corporate law. Covers the S&P 500 and S&P 100.
A US proxy reports pay three ways, and none is the UK single figure: the Summary Compensation Table counts equity at grant-date fair value in the year it is granted; Compensation Actually Paid counts the change in fair value of every outstanding award; the Stock Vested table lists what vested, but is not a total. Remlytica shows US pay as the UK does - fixed pay, the year’s bonus, and the shares and options that vested in the year, valued when they vested - and keeps the proxy’s own figures beside it.
Article 95(3) of the Federal Constitution, Articles 732–735d of the Code of Obligations, the binding annual shareholder vote and the statutory prohibition on severance. Outside the EU framework entirely.
Swiss law requires the individual amount for the highest-paid member of executive management, not for the chief executive. Where those are different people, a figure labelled as CEO pay is an inference.
The Stock Corporation Act as amended by ARUG II, the two-tier board, co-determination, the statutory maximum remuneration and the German Corporate Governance Code.
Management board pay is set by the supervisory board, which under co-determination is up to half employee representatives. A German remuneration committee is not the independent-non-executive body the term implies elsewhere.
The Code de commerce articles L. 22-10-8, L. 22-10-9 and L. 22-10-34, the binding ex-ante and ex-post say-on-pay votes, the equity ratios and the AFEP-MEDEF code.
Shareholders approve the policy in advance and then vote again on each officer’s award. Variable and exceptional pay cannot be paid until that second vote approves it, so an amount can be awarded, disclosed, and never paid.
Book 2 of the Civil Code, the three-quarters majority for a remuneration policy, the works council precondition, the statutory clawback powers and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.
A Dutch remuneration policy needs 75% of votes cast unless the company’s articles set a lower bar. A policy carried on 70% passes comfortably in the UK and fails here - so Remlytica reads each vote against the threshold that actually applied to it.
The Companies Act chapter 8 guidelines and remuneration report, the shareholder nomination committee, the Swedish Corporate Governance Code and employee board representation.
Swedish board fees are proposed by a nomination committee of shareholders sitting outside the board, not by the board receiving them. Comparing Swedish non-executive pay with a UK or US board that recommends its own fees compares two different processes.
The Consolidated Law on Finance article 123-ter, the Consob Issuers' Regulation and its prescribed tables, the collegio sindacale and the Corporate Governance Code.
The general meeting votes bindingly on the policy and advisorily on the pay actually paid - in the same document. Establish which section a vote result refers to before reading anything into it.
The Capital Companies Act articles 529 septdecies to novodecies and 541, the split between board-capacity and executive remuneration, the CNMV report model and the Código de buen gobierno.
The shareholder-approved maximum annual amount caps only pay to directors in their capacity as such. Executive pay comes from a contract approved by two thirds of the board, so the cap is not a ceiling on a chief executive’s package.
The Shareholder Rights Directive II framework shared by every member state, and the three axes on which national rules diverge. Denmark, Finland, Poland, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and Portugal - plus Norway, via the EEA.
The Directive lets each member state decide whether the shareholder vote binds. In France a vote can stop an executive being paid; in Germany the equivalent resolution creates neither rights nor obligations. Same Directive.
The dataset powers an interactive platform built for fast, comparative analysis.
Ten-year pay composition, fixed-vs-variable mix, incentive design and outcomes, shareholdings and pay-vs-TSR for any company.
Rank every CEO by any pay component or shareholder-return metric, filter by sector, and see each component as a % of salary.
Common-size comparisons, pay-vs-TSR bubble maps and incentive-metric maps that show how pay is structured across the market.
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